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Abstract
We consider three infinite hierarchies of what I call “two-dimensional temporal logics with explicit
realization operators”, viz. (i) one without historical or deontic modalities, (ii) one with historical
but without deontic modalities, and (iii) one with historical and with dyadic deontic modalities for
conditional obligation and permission. Sound and complete axiomatizations are obtained for all three
hierarchies relative to a simplified version of the finite co-ordinate-system semantics given for so-
called T × W logic of historical necessity in [L. Åqvist, The logic of historical necessity as founded
on two-dimensional modal tense logic, J. Philos. Logic 28 (1999) 329–369].
 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate some crucial properties of an infinite hierar-
chy of logics combining (i) a logic for the temporal realization operator Rt [“it is realized
(true) at time t that”; see Rescher [17], Rescher and Urquhart [18]] with (ii) a modal logic
for historical necessity or inevitability [Åqvist [3]], and with (iii) a dyadic deontic logic for
conditional obligation Åqvist [2,4].
1570-8683/$ – see front matter  2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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consider the quite recent contribution Carmo and Jones [11, Section 7.1], where the authors
make a number of useful observations concerning so-called temporal approaches to the
semantics of deontic notions (like those of obligation and permission). The most important
of these observations are, in my opinion, the following:
(I) The temporal approaches at issue are generally based on tree-structures representing
branching time with the same past and open to the future.
(II) On top of these tree-structures, temporal deontic logics typically define one modal
necessity operator, expressing some kind of inevitability or historical necessity, plus
deontic obligation operators of either a monadic or dyadic kind (where the latter are
to reflect notions of conditional obligation).
(III) A main difference appears in the way the temporal dimension is syntactically re-
flected in the formal language of the logics considered. One family of those logics
indexes the modal and deontic operators with temporal terms, whereas another fam-
ily introduces temporal operators that can be iterated and combined with the modal
and deontic operators.
(IV) A characteristic feature of the “indexed” temporal deontic logics is then the presence
in them of time-indexed modal and deontic operators: Carmo and Jones [11] point out
that the time-index could be “separated” from the modal/deontic operators so as to
yield a uniform semantical and logical setting for analyzing the modal/deontic com-
ponent of both types of temporal deontic logics, mentioned in (III) above. This, they
say, can be achieved by means of the temporal realization operator Rt [“it is realized
(true) at time t that”] of Rescher and Urquhart [18]. Let us add here that this means
that, instead of writing, like van Eck [12], Loewer and Belzer [15], and many others,
NtA for “it is necessary at time t that A”,
OtA for “it is obligatory at time t that A”, and
pt for “p-at-time-t”
we are to write, following Bailhache [9,10] and myself in [5],
RtNA,
RtOA, and
Rtp
in order to express the corresponding notions, where the “separation” just spoken of
is made perfectly clear and explicit.
In view of the above observations, the following problem naturally presents itself: What
is the logic of the operators Rt,N , and O , considered (i) separately,1 and (ii) in combi-
nation with one another? As for the logic of the modal operator N of historical necessity
1 One should observe here that considering those logics “separately” does not preclude our basic two-
dimensional temporal logic from containing other modal operators of great interest in their own right. See, e.g.,
Section 2 below in fine, category (vi).
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the dyadic deontic operator O (again considered separately), to my previous studies [2,4].
As far as the informal, philosophical motivation for our concentrating on precisely the log-
ics developed in those studies is concerned, we just refer the reader to the introductions
to those papers, where most relevant additional information can be found. However, some
main points made in earlier work of mine deserve to be rehearsed here; this will be done at
the end of the present introduction.
Two main novelties of the present paper are as follows.
(A) Inasmuch as we deal with the problem of combining the logic of Rt with that of N ,
we must be aware that the latter is represented as a special form of general two-dimensional
modal logics in the sense of Segerberg [19]. Two-dimensionality means in the approach of
Åqvist [3] that, in the semantics for N , we work with frames considered as (finite) two-
dimensional co-ordinate systems, where it is possible to distinguish between the longitude
(i.e., x-value) and the latitude (i.e., y-value) of any point in such a co-ordinate system.
Again, on that approach to the semantics2 for N , times were interpreted as longitudes, and
worlds, or histories, as latitudes in such systems.
Now, facing the problem of combining the logic of N with a connective expressing tem-
poral realization, we immediately see that the Rescher operator Rt , read as “it is realized at
time t that”, is not the one that comes most naturally to mind, because it is neither discrim-
inative nor general enough. A more plausible and natural candidate for being combined
with our N of historical necessity (inevitability) would instead seem to be Rth, read as “it
is realized at time t in history h that”. However, as will be seen in Sections 3–4 below,
Rescher’s Rt is readily definable3 in terms of Rth, using the technique of so-called system-
atic frame constants, which was a characteristic feature of the Åqvist [3] approach to the
logic of historical necessity.
Upshot: the above combination problem will in this paper be re-formulated as one of
combining the logic of the more general operator Rth with that of N and that of O .
(B) Let us next consider the question how to combine our logic of N with the one for
the dyadic deontic operator O , proposed in [2,4], where we encounter a new application
of the technique of systematic frame constants: they are, in the present deontic context,
taken to represent different “levels of perfection” (as explained in those papers). It turns
out that this problem admits of a fairly simple solution: (i) co-ordinate the various levels of
perfection (denoted by our new frame constants) with the latitudes (representing worlds,
or histories) in the semantics for N , and then (ii) re-interpret the modal operators for uni-
versal necessity and universal possibility used in [2,4] precisely as historical necessity and
historical possibility in the sense of our present logic of N and M .
2 We may notice here that our present semantics for N is simplified as compared to the one proposed in [3],
where I worked simultaneously with two different semantical frameworks, a “relational” one and a “non-
relational” one. As was correctly pointed out by the JPL-referee of that paper, this complication is unnecessary
and can be overcome. However, the simplification achieved here is different from the one suggested by him/her.
3 See, e.g., axiom schema A3(a) in Section 4 infra. Again, from axiom schemata A4(d)–(f) in the same section
it appears that even the three operators N lg,N lat and  (as well as their duals), introduced as primitives in
Section 2 infra, are definable in terms of Rth and the frame constants ai and bj . This is easily verified by the
reader.
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lows.
In Sections 2–4 we present the syntax, semantics and proof theory for an infinite hier-
archy Rxy (with x, y any natural numbers in ω) of two-dimensional temporal logics with
explicit realization operators Rt and Rth without historical or deontic modalities. Section 5
establishes two fundamental results on so-called canonical Rxy-structures (the proofs of
which are given in a concluding appendix); together they yield strong as well as weak
completeness of the logics (axiomatic systems) Rxy by means of the more or less standard
argument given at the end of Section 5. Again, Sections 6–8 are devoted to the study of
a new hierarchy HRxy (x, y ∈ ω) of logics with the historical modalities N and M added
to the vocabulary of the Rxy, but still without deontic modalities: the semantics and proof
theory of the systems Rxy are extended to the HRxy, for which we obtain extended com-
pleteness results (main proofs again being relegated to the appendix). Finally, we achieve
a desired extension of our Rt/Rth logics HRxy of historical necessity to a third infinite
hierarchy DHRxym (x, y,m ∈ ω) of dyadic deontic logics of conditional obligation and
permission, for which similar results are obtained in the same spirit.
We close this introduction by rehearsing some main points in earlier work of mine, the
most important of which are as follows.
(i) In [3] we gave two types of semantics for our proposed infinite hierarchy of logics
of historical necessity and illustrated how they differ in their treatment of that notion by
means of two contrasting diagrams. According to the first type, we interpret sentences of
the forms NA and MA (my present notation) relative to tree-structures like
by telling under what conditions such a sentence is true at a time in a history. On this
approach, truth is thus relative to two indices. According to the second type of semantics,
we proceed as follows: transform (convert) any tree-structure like the one shown above
into a rectangular grid
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alence relation on the ‘longitudes’ (heuristically times). The truth conditions for sentences
of the forms NA and MA (my present notation) are then given in terms of this equivalence
relation in the standard manner, i.e., truth is relative to just one index on this approach, viz.
any point in the rectangular space.
We note that the two types of structure relative to which we interpret sentences of the
forms NA and MA are to a certain extent analogous to the so-called T × W frames and sep-
arated T × W frames in von Kutschera [14]. It turned out that our respective completeness
proofs were facilitated by his use of separated T × W frames and my use of rectangular
grids instead of the rival structures just mentioned, i.e., unseparated T × W frames and
unconverted trees.
(ii) An important difference between the Åqvist [3] approach and the one advocated by
von Kutschera [14] is due to the fact that, on the former, we assumed time to be discrete
and finite in the sense of having a beginning and an end. The main motivation for thus
limiting our framework to a discrete and finite one goes back to my work on Causation
in the Law together with Philip Mullock in our joint book Åqvist and Mullock [8], which
was judiciously reviewed by von Kutschera in the review von Kutschera [13], dealing pri-
marily with the philosophically relevant aspects of our enterprise. In [8] we developed a
detailed theory of causation by agents and the representation of causal issues in Tort and
Criminal Law, which is based on a version of Games and Game Theory in Extensive Form
and where legal cases (Anglo–American, Swedish, German) are examined and graphically
represented by means of game trees. When embarking on our project we felt that using a
discrete and finite framework was the natural starting point, mainly because of what we
took to be the fundamentally finitistic nature of legal reasoning. In his [13] review von
Kutschera points out that this, of course, amounts to a partly serious limitation of our
model. However, he agrees with us on the need for a theory of liability and causation in the
law that is, in the first place, intuitively clear in the sense of being sufficiently simple to ap-
ply. On the other hand he emphasizes that, since no simple model fits all the complex cases
of human life, one has to find a compromise between simplicity and scope of applicability,
whence he suggests that further refinements of our model be made later on according as
needs for such refinements arise.
(iii) An interesting point intimately bound up with the foregoing one is this. The dis-
crete and finite framework used in [8], and later in Åqvist [6], turns out to be fruitful
in enabling us to explicate and represent formally the useful distinction between (i) ba-
sic action-sentences asserting that such and such an act is performed/omitted by an
agent, and (ii) causative action-sentences asserting that by performing/omitting a cer-
tain act, an agent causes that such and such a state-of-affairs is realized (e.g., comes
about/ceases/remains/remains absent—see von Wright [20, p. 173 f.]). As appears from
[6], the discreteness property of our framework is then seen to play an important role in
the present context.
(iv) Again, the temporal setting of Åqvist and Hoepelman [7] happened to be infinite—
in the sense of requiring a denumerably infinite number of times and admitting a denumer-
ably infinite number of histories, which were all taken to be of infinite length. However, its
treatment of the Chisholm Contrary-to-Duty Paradox—a key problem in deontic logic—
would, I suggest, be best understood in a finite framework like the one proposed here
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bine temporal-logic-with-historical-necessity precisely with dyadic deontic logic of the
sort studied in [2,4].
(v) The problem of combining the discrete and finite approach adopted in [3] and the
present paper with the discrete and infinite one used in [7] remains open.
2. Syntax of the systems Rxy of two-dimensional temporal logic with explicit
realization operators Rt [“it is realized at time t that”] and Rth [“it is realized at
time t in history h that”]
The vocabulary (morphology, alphabet, language) of the systems Rxy (x, y ∈ ω) is a
structure made up of the following disjoint basic syntactic categories:
(i) An at most denumerable set Prop of propositional variables.
(ii) Propositional constants, subdivided into
(a) traditional: (verum) and ⊥(falsum), and
(b) ‘new’: two families of systematic frame constants, viz.
{ai}i∈ω, indicating positions on the x-axis [‘longitudes’];
{bj }j∈ω, indicating positions on the y-axis [‘latitudes’].
(iii) A set NT = {ti}i∈ω of names of times (temporal names) as well as a set NH = {hj }j∈ω
of names of histories (‘worlds’).
(iv) The Boolean sentential connectives ¬,∧,∨,→,↔ with their usual readings.
(v) An indexed family {Rti}i∈ω of one-place temporal realization operators, where Rti is
read as “it is realized at time ti that”, as well as a doubly indexed family {Rtihj }i,j∈ω
of one-place time-history realization operators, with Rtihj read as “it is realized at
time ti in history (world) hj that”.
(vi) Three pairs (N lat,M lat), (N lg,M lg) and (,♦) of one-place modal operators in two-
dimensional temporal logic, the readings of which will be considered in a moment.
For any natural numbers x, y, we then define recursively the set Sent of well formed
sentences of Rxy in the straightforward manner, i.e., in such a way that all propositional
variables and constants will be (atomic) sentences; moreover, Sent will be closed under
every connective in the categories (iv)–(vi) supra. In particular, as far as the category (v)
is concerned, we stipulate that if ti ∈ NT and A ∈ Sent, then RtiA ∈ Sent; and that if in
addition hj ∈ NH, then RtihjA ∈ Sent (this being the only non-standard clause in our
recursive definition of Sent).
As to the readings of the one-place modalities in the category (vi), we tentatively invoke
the following spatial metaphors:
N latA—everywhere on this latitude, A
M latA—somewhere on this latitude, A
N lgA—everywhere on this longitude, A
M lgA—somewhere on this longitude, A
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♦A—somewhere, A.
3. Semantics for Rxy: Frames, models and truth conditions
3.1. Rxy-frames
For any pair of natural numbers (x, y), we mean by a Rxy-frame an ordered quadruple
F = (U, (u0, e0, n0), ({τi}i∈ω, x), ({wj }j∈ω, y))
where:
(i) U = ∅ [U is a non-empty, finite set of points in time].
(ii) u0, e0, n0 are designated members of U [heuristically, u0 is the origin in U , e0 is the
eastern limit of U , and n0 is the northern limit of U ].
(iii) {τi}i∈ω is an infinite sequence of subsets of U [heuristically times] and x is the first
natural number under consideration.
Let T = {τ0, τ1, . . . , τx}. We then require the set T to be a partition of U in the familiar
sense that
(iii:a) τ0 ∪ · · · ∪ τx = U .
(iii:b) For all i, j ∈ ω with 0 i = j  x: τi ∩ τj = ∅.
(iii:c) For each i ∈ ω with 0  i  x: τi = ∅.
(iii:d) For each i ∈ ω with x < i: τi = ∅.
(iv) {wj }j∈ω is an infinite sequence of subsets of U [heuristically histories, worlds] and
y is the second natural number under consideration.
Let W = {w0,w1, . . . ,wy}. We require the set W to be a partition of U in the sense that
(iv:a) w0 ∪ · · · ∪wy = U .
(iv:b) For all i, j ∈ ω with 0 i = j  y: wi ∩wj = ∅.
(iv:c) For each j ∈ ω with 0 j  y: wj = ∅.
(iv:d) For each j ∈ ω with y < j : wj = ∅.
Furthermore, we require any Rxy-frame to satisfy the following additional conditions:
(v) For each τ in T and each w in W there is exactly one u in U such that {u} = τ ∩w.
(vi) {u0} = τ0 ∩w0, {e0} = τx ∩w0, and {n0} = τ0 ∩wy .
3.2. Rxy-models and truth conditions
Let F = (U, (u0, e0, n0), ({τi}i∈ω, x), ({wj }j∈ω, y)) be any Rxy-frame. By a valuation
on such a frame we mean any function V which to each propositional variable p in Prop
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w ∈ W .
By a Rxy-model we then mean an ordered triple
M = (F ,V ,v)
the first term of which is a Rxy-frame, the second a valuation on that frame, and where v
is the function defined on NT ∪ NH such that, for all i ∈ ω:
v(ti) =
{
τi, if 0 i  x,
∅, otherwise, i.e., if x < i
and such that, for all j ∈ ω:
v(hj ) =
{
wj , if 0 j  y,
∅, otherwise, i.e., if y < j.
Let M = ((U, (u0, e0, n0), ({τi}i∈ω, x), ({wj }j∈ω, y)),V ,v) be a Rxy-model. We can now
tell what it means for any sentence A to be true at a time τ ∈ T = {τ0, τ1, . . . , τx} in a world
w ∈ W = {w0,w1, . . . ,wy} in M (in symbols: M, τ,w A) by the following recursion:
M, τ,w  p iff (τ,w) ∈ V (p), for any p in Prop
M, τ,w 
not: M, τ,w ⊥
M, τ,w  ai(i ∈ ω) iff
{
τ = τi, if 0 i  x,
τ = τ, otherwise, i.e., if x < i
M, τ,w  bj (j ∈ ω) iff
{
w = wj , if 0 j  y,
w = w, otherwise, i.e., if y < j.
If A is a Boolean compound, the recursive definition goes on as usual. We then handle
sentences having the characteristic one-place Rxy-connectives as their main operator as
follows:
M, τ,w RtihjB iff


M, τi(= v(ti)),wj (= v(hj ))  B,
if 0 i  x and 0 j  y
for all (τ ′,w′) in T ×W with τ ′ = τ ′ and w′ = w′:
M, τ ′,w′  B, otherwise; i.e., if x < i or y < j
M, τ,w RtiB iff


M, τi(= v(ti)),w  B, if 0 i  x
for all τ ′ in T with τ ′ = τ ′: M, τ ′,w  B,
otherwise; i.e., if x < i
M, τ,w N latB iff for all τ ′ in T : M, τ ′,w  B
M, τ,w N lgB iff for all w′ in W : M, τ,w′  B
M, τ,w B iff for all τ ′ in T and all w′ in W : M, τ ′,w′  B.
The truth conditions for sentences having the possibility operators M lat,M lg and ♦ as their
main connective are obtained in the dual way: just replace ‘all’ by ‘some’ to the right of
the ‘iff’ in the last three conditions!
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M , all τ in T and all w in W . And we say that a set Γ of sentences is Rxy-satisfiable iff
there exists a Rxy-model M with members τ of T and w of W such that for all sentences A
in Γ : M, τ,w A.
Remark. Consider the truth condition for sentences of the form RtiB , the case where
0 i  x. It looks simple and straightforward enough, but the impression of simplicity is
really deceptive, because the condition harbours a hidden complexity that can be spelled
out as follows. Recall that w is to be a member of W = {w0,w1, . . . ,wy} throughout the
above truth definition. For the case we are considering this means that the truth condition
for RtiB is to be split up into the following series of conditional truth conditions, whenever
0 i  x:
If w = w0, then M, τ,w RtiB iff M, τi,w0  B [iff M, τ,w Rtih0B]
If w = w1, then M, τ,w RtiB iff M, τi,w1  B [iff M, τ,w Rtih1B]
...
If w = wj , then M, τ,w RtiB iff M, τi,wj  B [iff M, τ,w RtihjB]
...
If w = wy, then M, τ,w RtiB iff M, τi,wy  B [iff M, τ,w RtihyB].
We see that the bracketed ‘iff’-clauses are immediate by our truth condition for RtihjB ,
the case where 0  i  x and 0  j  y. A further observation is now to the effect that
the above series, or conjunction, of conditional truth conditions is in fact equivalent to the
following categorical truth condition for RtiB , where the right member has the form of a
disjunction:
M, τ,w RtiB iff either (w = w0 and M, τ,w Rtih0B)
or (w = w1 and M, τ,w Rtih1B)
or . . .
or (w = wj and M, τ,w RtihjB)
or . . .
or (w = wy and M, τ,w RtihyB).
Again, this categorical truth condition can be written more compactly as:
M, τ,w RtiB iff
∨
0jy
(w = wj and M, τ,w RtihjB)
where the initial prefix in the right member of the equivalence may be replaced by an
existential quantifier ‘for some natural number j with 0  j  y’, since we are dealing
with a finite set.
The complexity just pointed out will reappear in the form of the “definitional” axiom
schema A3(a) in Section 4 as well as in the proof of the so called Coincidence Lemma 5.3
in the Appendix infra. See also our discussion of the matter in the Introduction supra.
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operators: the axiomatic systems Rxy
The infinite hierarchy of axiomatic systems Rxy (x, y ∈ ω) is determined by one
rule of inference (deduction), one rule of proof, and five groups of axiom schemata.
They are as follows, where the letters ‘i’ and ‘j ’ range throughout over the set ω of all
the natural numbers, and where a notation like ‘
∨
0jy RtihjA’ [‘
∧
0ix Rtihj ’] ab-
breviates the finite disjunction ‘Rtih0A ∨ Rtih1A ∨ · · · ∨ Rtihy ’ [the finite conjunction
‘Rt0hjA∧Rt1hjA∧ · · · ∧RtxhjA’], with j running from 0 to y [i from 0 to x]:
Rule of inference
mp (modus ponens)
A,A → B
B
Rule of proof
Nec (necessitation for )
A
A
Axiom schemata
A0. All truth-functional tautologies over Sent
A1.
(a) ai ∧ bj ∧A → RtihjA, for all i, j such that 0 i  x and 0 j  y
(b) Rtihj (ai ∧ bj ), for all i, j such that 0 i  x and 0 j  y
(c) Rtihj⊥, if x < i or y < j
(d) a0 ∨ a1 ∨ · · · ∨ ax
(e) b0 ∨ b1 ∨ · · · ∨ by
(f) ai → ¬aj , if i = j
(g) bi → ¬bj , if i = j
(h) ¬ai, if x < i
(k) ¬bj , if y < j
(m) ai → N lgai (all i ∈ ω)
(n) bj → N latbj (all j ∈ ω).
A2.
(a) A → RtihjA, for all i, j ∈ ω
(b) Rtihj (A → B) → (RtihjA → RtihjB), for all i, j ∈ ω
(c) RtihjA →RtihjA for all i, j ∈ ω
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(e) RtihjA → ¬Rtihj¬A, for all i, j with 0 i  x and 0 j  y.
A3.
(a) RtiA ↔
∨
0jy
(bj ∧RtihjA), if 0 i  x
(b) Rti⊥, if x < i.
A4.
(a) A → N latA; A → N lgA
(b) A ↔ N latN lgA; A ↔ N lgN latA
(c) The modal logic S5 for each pair of operators (,♦), (N lat,M lat)
and (N lg,M lg)
(d) ai → (N lgA ↔
∧
0jy
RtihjA), for all i ∈ ω
(e) bj → (N latA ↔
∧
0ix
RtihjA), for all j ∈ ω
(f) A ↔ ∧
0ix
∧
0jy
RtihjA.
As usual, the above axiom schemata and rules determine syntactic notions of Rxy-
provability and Rxy-deducibility as follows. We say that a sentence A is Rxy-provable
[in symbols: Rxy A, or just  A] iff A belongs to the smallest subset of Sent which
(i) contains every instance of A0, A1(a)–(n), . . . , A4(a)–(f) as its member, and which (ii) is
closed under the rule of inference mp and the rule of proof Nec. And we say that the sen-
tence A is Rxy-deducible from the set Γ (⊆ Sent) of assumptions [in symbols: Γ Rxy A]
iff there are sentences B1, . . . ,Bk in Γ , for some natural number k  0, such that Rxy
(B1 ∧ · · · ∧Bk) → A (i.e., the sentence (B1 ∧ · · · ∧Bk) → A is to be Rxy-provable in the
sense of the preceding definition).
Again, letting Γ ⊆ Sent, we say that Γ is Rxy-inconsistent iff Γ Rxy ⊥, and Rxy-
consistent otherwise. Finally, we say that Γ is maximal Rxy-consistent iff Γ is Rxy-
consistent and, for each A in Sent, either A ∈ Γ or ¬A ∈ Γ ; where this latter condition is
known as requiring Γ to be negation-complete.
Soundness Theorem 4.1.
Weak version: Every Rxy-provable sentence is Rxy-valid.
Strong version: Every Rxy-satisfiable set of sentences is Rxy-consistent.
Proof. As usual, we establish the weak version by showing (i) that every instance of the
axiom schemata A0, A1(a)–(n), . . . , A4(a)–(f) is Rxy-valid, and (ii) that the rules mp and
Nec preserve Rxy-validity. This is tedious, but entirely routine.
As to the strong version, it is easily obtained as a consequence of the weak one. 
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following
Lemma 4.2 (Scott’s rule for Rxy; Fresh properties of maximal Rxy-consistent sets; Lin-
denbaum’s Lemma for Rxy). Let § be any of the operators Rtihj (i, j ∈ ω),N lat,N lg,
(all of which are ‘necessity modalities’ in a straightforward sense). Then:
(I) Let Γ be a set of sentences and let A be a sentence. If Γ Rxy A, then {§B: B ∈
Γ } Rxy §A.
(II) Let Γ be any maximal Rxy-consistent set of sentences. Then it holds that:
(i) ai ∈ Γ , for exactly one natural number i such that 0 i  x.
(ii) bj ∈ Γ , for exactly one natural number j such that 0 j  y.
(III) For any Rxy-consistent set Γ of sentences, define the Lindenbaum extension Γω of Γ
in the appropriate way. Then Γω is maximal Rxy-consistent.
Proof. As for (I), this is familiar—see e.g. [16] or [1, Lemma 6.5]. As for (II), we argue as
follows. By a well known property of maximal Rxy-consistent sets, the disjunction A1(d)
is in Γ . Hence, by another such property, at least one of its disjuncts must be in Γ . Hence
the existence part of clause (i). The uniqueness of ‘that’ disjunct is then immediate by
axiom A1(f) supra. The proof of clause (ii) is similar: just appeal to A1(e) and A1(g).
Finally, the proof of (III) is familiar as well. 
Lemma 4.3 (Useful properties of the operators Rti , Rtihj and N lat, M lat).
(I) For all natural numbers x, y it holds that all instances of the following theorem
schemata are Rxy-provable:
T0. bj → (RtiA ↔ RtihjA) for all i, j ∈ ω such that 0 i  x and 0 j  y
T1. Rti(A → B) → (RtiA → RtiB) for all i with 0 i  x
T2. RtiA ↔ ¬Rti¬A for all i with 0 i  x
T3. RtiA ↔ N latRtiA (0 i  x); RtiA ↔ M latRtiA (0 i  x)
T4. bj → (N latA → RtihjA) (0 i  x; j ∈ ω)
T5. bj → (RtihjA → M latA) (0 i  x; j ∈ ω)
T6. bj →
(
M latA ↔
∨
0ix
RtihjA
)
(j ∈ ω)
T7. RtiA ↔ RtkRtiA for all i, k ∈ ω with 0 i, k  x.
(II) In spite of the provability/validity in Rxy of T0, there are instances of the schema
RtihjA → RtiA
which fail to be provable/valid in Rxy. (Similarly for the converse of that schema.)
Proof. As to (I), the proofs in Rxy of the theorem schemata T0–T7 amount to useful
exercises in the axiomatics for Rxy that are left to the reader. As for (II), the task of con-
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to the reader as well. 
5. Canonical Rxy-structures and semantic completeness of the logics Rxy
Definition 5.1. For any natural numbers x, y ∈ ω, let Ωxy be the set of all maximal Rxy-
consistent set of sentences. Let q be a fixed element of Ωxy. Furthermore, let ∼lat/∼lg/ be
the binary relation on Ωxy such that for all u,v in Ωxy: u ∼lat v/u∼lgv/ iff for each A
in Sent, if N latA/N lgA/ ∈ u, then A ∈ v. Again, let ∼ be the binary relation on Ωxy such
that for all u,v in Ωxy: u ∼ v iff for each A in Sent, if A ∈ u, then A ∈ v. Clearly, by the
S5-properties of the operators N lat,N lg and  [axiom schema A4(c) supra], the relations
∼lat, ∼lg, and ∼ are equivalence relations on Ωxy.
We now define the canonical Rxy-structure generated by q as the ordered sextuple
Mq = (U, (u0, e0, n0), ({τi}i∈ω, x), ({wj }j∈ω, y),V ,v)
where:
(i) U = {u ∈ Ωxy: for each sentence A, if A ∈ q, then A ∈ u}, i.e.,
U = {u ∈ Ωxy: q ∼ u} = [q] ∼ (i.e., the ∼-equivalence class of q in Ωxy).
(ii) u0 = {A: Rt0h0A ∈ q}
e0 = {A: Rtxh0A ∈ q}
n0 = {A: Rt0hyA ∈ q}.
(iii) For each i ∈ ω:
τi =
{ {u ∈ Ωxy: {A: Rtih0A ∈ q} ∼ lgu}, if 0 i  x,
∅, otherwise, i.e., if x < i
where x is the first natural number under consideration.
(iv) For each j ∈ ω:
wj =
{ {u ∈ Ωxy: {A: Rt0hjA ∈ q} ∼ lat u}, if 0 j  y
∅, otherwise, i.e., if y < j
where y is the second natural number under consideration.
(v) V = the function such that for all p in Prop: V (p) = {(τi,wj ): 0 i  x,0 j  y,
and there is exactly one u in U with u ∈ τi ∩wj and p ∈ u}.
(vi) v = the function on NT ∪ NH defined as in Section 3 supra.
Remark. Assume that 0  i  x and 0  j  y. By condition (iii), T = {τ0, τ1, . . . , τx}
is identified with a certain set of ∼ lg-equivalence-classes of members of Ωxy, and, by
condition (iv), W = {w0,w1, . . . ,wy} is identified with a certain set of ∼lat-equivalence-
classes of members of Ωxy. See our Appendix infra.
We can now state two basic results concerning generated canonical Rxy-structures.
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frame, and hence Mq as a whole is a Rxy-model.
Proof. See Appendix infra. 
Coincidence Lemma 5.3. 4 Let q be any fixed maximal Rxy-consistent set of sentences,
and let Mq (as above) be the canonical Rxy-structure generated by q . Then, for each
sentence A and each u in U ,
Mq, [u] ∼ lg, [u] ∼ lat A iff A ∈ u.
Here we use the following familiar definitional abbreviations: [u] ∼ lg = {v ∈ U : u ∼
lgv} and [u] ∼ lat = {v ∈ U : u ∼ latv}. Note also that the first set belongs to T and the
second to W . (In order to verify that this is indeed so, just appeal to the fact [Theorem 5.2]
that Mq satisfies the partition conditions (iii:a)–(iii:b)/(iv:a)–(iv:b)/ on Rxy-frames in Sec-
tion 3, to the definition of τi/wj/ in Definition 5.1 above, and to elementary properties of
equivalence relations.)
Proof. By induction on the length of A. For details, see Appendix infra. 
Completeness Theorem 5.4.
Weak version: Every Rxy-valid sentence is Rxy-provable.
Strong version: Every Rxy-consistent set of sentences is Rxy-satisfiable.
Proof. As the weak version is immediate from the strong one, let us concentrate on the
latter.
Let Γ be any Rxy-consistent set of sentences. Form the Lindenbaum extension Γω
of Γ : by Lemma 4.2(III), Γω is maximal Rxy-consistent. Again, form the canonical Rxy-
structure generated by Γω, i.e., the structure MΓ ω as defined in Definition 5.1 supra: by
the basic Theorem 5.2, then, MΓ ω is a Rxy-model. By the Coincidence Lemma 5.3 for
generated canonical Rxy-structures, we obtain in particular that for each sentence A:
MΓ ω, [Γω] ∼ lg, [Γω] ∼ lat A iff A ∈ Γω
since Γω is known to belong to the universe U of MΓ ω. Hence, since Γ ⊆ Γω, we have
MΓ ω, [Γω] ∼ lg, [Γω] ∼ lat  A for every A ∈ Γ . In other words, assuming Γ to be any
Rxy-consistent set of sentences, we have constructed a Rxy-model, viz. MΓ ω , with mem-
bers τ of T and w of W , viz. [Γω] ∼ lg and [Γω] ∼ lat, such that for all sentences A in
Γ : MΓ ω, τ,w A. Hence, we have shown Γ to be Rxy-satisfiable, as desired. 
4 The word “Coincidence” used in the name of this lemma is meant to suggest that, as applied to any sentences
(of Rxy), the notions of truth and membership coincide, or are co-extensive, with respect to the points in generated
canonical Rxy-structures.
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6.1. Syntax of HRxy
Let us add to the vocabulary of the systems Rxy a pair of primitive one-place modal
operators, N and M , to be read respectively as
‘it is necessary on the basis of the past and the present that’, and
‘it is possible on the basis of the past and the present that’.
Call the resulting language that of the systems HRxy (of two-dimensional temporal logic
with the Rt and Rth operators and with historical necessity), where, as usual, x, y are any
members of the set ω of natural numbers. The definition of the set Sent of well formed
sentences of HRxy is then obvious: Sent will be closed under the two new one-place con-
nectives as well.
6.2. Semantics for HRxy
Consider any Rxy-frame as described in Section 3 supra. We lay down a few prelimi-
nary definitions. First of all, observe that for each u in U there is, by conditions (iii:a) and
(iii:b), exactly one τ in T such that u ∈ τ , as well as, by (iv:a) and (iv:b), exactly one w
in W such that u ∈ w. Define for all u,v in U :
lg(u) = the τ ∈ T : u ∈ τ
lat(u) = the w ∈ W : u ∈ w
u ∼ lgv iff lg(u) = lg(v)
u ∼ latv iff lat(u) = lat(v)
where the function lg/lat/ is to mean the longitude/latitude/ of, and where the binary relation
∼ lg/ ∼ lat/ means is on the same longitude/latitude/ as.
(On the present general definitions of the relations ∼ lg and ∼ lat—‘general’ in the
sense of applying to all Rxy-frames, not just to the initial quadruple in Mq of the preceding
section—these two relations are equivalence relations on U , so we are still entitled to use
the standard notation for equivalence classes, i.e., ‘[ ] ∼ lg’ and ‘[ ] ∼ lat’.)
Again, since any Rxy-frame satisfies the condition (v) in Section 3, we can define the
following function f from T ×W into U . For each τ in T and each w in W :
f (τ,w) = the u in U : {u} = τ ∩w
i.e., f (τ,w) is identical to the sole member of the intersection τ ∩w.
6.3. HRxy-frames
We now take a HRxy-frame to be result of adding to any Rxy-frame a binary equivalence
relation ≈ on U satisfying the following conditions, for all u,v in U :
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(C2≈) If u0 ∼ lgu, then u0 ≈ u.
Moreover, ≈ is to satisfy, for all integers i, k such that 0  k < i  x and all integers
j,m with 0 j,m y:
(C3≈) If f (τi,wj ) ≈ f (τi,wm), then f (τk,wj ) ≈ f (τk,wm).
Remark. The intuitive import of the relation ≈ is this: we have u ≈ v iff (i) lg(u) = lg(v),
i.e., the time of u is identical to the time of v, and, moreover, (ii) lat(u) and lat(v), i.e.,
the histories to which u,v respectively belong, share the same past and present up to and
including the time which is common to u and v; in other words, lat(u) and lat(v) are
to ‘coincide’ at the time lg(u) [= lg(v)] and at all times in T previous to lg(u). Hence,
(C1≈) requires the equivalence relation ≈ to be, for any u in U , a relation on the ∼ lg-
equivalence class [u] ∼ lg (= {v ∈ U : u ∼ lgv}). Furthermore, (C2≈) guarantees that
the ∼ lg-equivalence class [u0] ∼ lg can be taken as the origin of the finite tree which is
definable on any HRxy-frame by means of ≈. Finally, (C3≈) is a characteristic condition
on ≈, leading to the representation of time by such a tree. In the suggestive terminology of
Zanardo [21], we may say that (C3≈) requires f (τi,wj ) ≈ f (τi,wm) to hold only if the
(strict) pasts of f (τi,wj ) and f (τi,wm) ‘coincide modulo ≈’.
6.4. HRxy-models and truth conditions
We now take a valuation on a HRxy-frame still to be any function V from Prop into
the power-set of T ×W . In accordance with our informal characterization of ≈ just given
above, we then require V to satisfy the following condition, for all p in Prop and all u,v
in U :
(C4≈) If u ≈ v, then ([u] ∼ lg, [u] ∼ lat) ∈ V (p) iff ([v] ∼ lg, [v] ∼ lat) ∈ V (p).
As usual, then, we mean by a HRxy-model any ordered triple
M = (F ,V ,v)
where the first term is a HRxy-frame, the second a valuation on that frame, and where v
is as in Section 3 supra. In the extended truth definition relative to HRxy-models we now
have the following truth condition for sentences of the form NB:
M, τ,w NB iff for all w′ in W such that f (τ,w) ≈ f (τ,w′): M, τ,w′  B;
and dually for MB .
Finally, the notions of HRxy-validity and HRxy-satisfiability are straightforward.
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and historical necessity: The axiomatic systems HRxy
Each axiomatic system in the infinite hierarchy HRxy (x, y ∈ ω) still has mp as its
sole primitive rule of inference and Nec (for ) as its sole primitive rule of proof, but, in
addition to the five groups A0, A1(a)–(n), . . . , A4(a)–(f) of axiom schemata, it has a sixth
group of axioms governing the new modalities N and M , viz. the following:
A5.
(a) N lgA → NA; MA → M lgA
(b) Rt0h0NA → Rt0h0N lgA
(c) The modal logic S5 for N and M
(d) p → Np, for all p in Prop
(e) wNA → NwA.
(f) Rti−nhjNA → RtihjNRti−nA, for all i, n ∈ ω with 1 n i  x
and all j ∈ ω with 0 j  y.
Remark. In the next to last axiom, A5(e), there occurs a one-place operator w [“at the last
point west of here on this latitude”, “yesterday”] used already in [3, Section 11], which can
be defined in our present framework in terms of the systematic frame constants ai and bj
together with the realization operators Rtihj as follows:
Def.w. wA ↔df
∨
0jy
(
bj ∧
(
a0 ∨
∨
0<ix
(ai ∧Rti−1hjA)
))
where the
∨
-notations denote certain finite disjunctions in the familiar way.
The definitions of the notions of provability, deducibility, consistency and maximal con-
sistency for HRxy are straightforward.
Soundness Theorem 7.1 & Lemma 7.2. Both versions of the Soundness Theorem 4.1 are
readily extended to the logics HRxy. In like manner, Lemma 4.2 is easily extended so as
to apply to the fresh hierarchy of systems HRxy. For instance, in the validation of Scott’s
Rule for HRxy [clause (I)] we allow for the case that § = N . Further details are left to the
reader.
Let us list some useful properties of the defined operator w in the following
Lemma 7.3. (i) As defined by Def.w, this is a derived rule of proof both in HRxy + Def.w
and already in Rxy + Def.w, where, for the sake of expository simplicity, we write just ‘’
to indicate provability in the relevant system:
w-necessitation: from  A to infer  wA.
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as well as in HRxy + Def.w:
T1. N latA → wA
T2. ai → (wA → ¬w¬A), for all integers i such that 1 i < ω
T3. w(A → B) → (wA → wB).
Proof. Ad w-necessitation. To derive this rule of proof in the system at issue, use the
primitive rule of proof Nec (= necessitation for ) together with axiom schema A4(a) and
the fresh theorem schema T1 just stated.
Ad T1. Use various axioms under A1, A2 and A4 [notably A4(e)] together with Def.w!
Ad T2 and T3. Similarly. 
Lemma 7.4 (Properties of the new operators N,M).
(I) For all natural numbers x, y it holds that all instances of the following theorem
schemata are HRxy-provable:
T4. RtihjNA ↔ RtihjNRtiA for all i, j ∈ ω such that 0 i  x
and 0 j  y
T5. Rti−nhjNRtiA → RtihjNRtiA for all i, n, j ∈ ω with 1 n i  x
and 0 j  y
T6. Rtihjp → RtihjNRtip for all i, j ∈ ω with 0 i  x, 0 j  y and
for all p in Prop.
(II) None of the following sentence schemata are HRxy-provable or HRxy-valid:
(a) bj → Nbj (0 j  y)
(b) RtiA → NRtiA (0 i  x) [in contrast to T3 in Lemma 4.3(I)]
(c) NA → N lgA
(d) NA → N latA
(e) NA →A
(f) N latA → NN latA
(g) M latA → NM latA
(h) Rti−nNA → RtiNA, for all i, n ∈ ω with 1 n i  x
(k) Rti−nA → RtiNRti−nA, for all i, n ∈ ω with 1 n i  x.
(III) In the spirit of [7, Section 12, Theorem 2], axiom A5(d) [p → Np, for p in Prop]
can be generalized so as to yield the following theorem schema of HRxy:
T7. A → NA, provided that A contains no occurrences of the operators Rti,
N lat, or M lat or of any frame constant bj (0 j < ω).
L. Åqvist / Journal of Applied Logic 3 (2005) 421–460 439Proof. As to (I), the proofs in HRxy of the theorem schemata T4–T6 amount to exercises
left to the reader, somewhat tedious in the first case. [We observe that analogues of T4
and T5 are taken as axioms in Bailhache [10, Ch. IV, p. 74 f.], and that an analogue of T6
is discussed by the author in the very same context.] As for (II), we leave to the reader
the task of constructing appropriate counterexamples to the HRxy-validity of the schemata
(a)–(k). [Note that the schemata (h) and (k) are analogues of van Eck’s Th1 and Th2 on p.
280 in the Logique et Analyse 25 (1982) version of van Eck [12].] As for (III), the proof
of T7 is by an easy induction on the length of A. In the basis we appeal to A5(d), A5(a)
and A1(m). For the interesting cases in the induction step, we use inter alia A4(a), A4(c),
A5(a), A5(c) and A2(c). 
8. Semantic completeness of the logics HRxy
8.1. Preliminaries: Generated canonical HRxy-structures
We begin by extending Definition 5.1. So the canonical HRxy-structure generated by
any fixed maximal HRxy-consistent set of sentences q will be the ordered septuple
Mq = (U, (u0, e0, n0), ({τi}i∈ω, x), ({wj }j∈ω, y),≈,V ,v)
where
(i) U = {u ∈ ΩHRxy: for each A in Sent, if A ∈ q, then A ∈ u}
(with ΩHRxy being the set of all maximal HRxy-consistent sets of sentences)
and where the remaining conditions (ii)–(vi) now apply to U in this new sense and to
the set Sent of sentences in our expanded language of HRxy. Moreover, there will be the
following fresh condition governing our new equivalence relation ≈:
(iv ≈) ≈ is the binary relation on U such that for all u,v in U : u ≈ v iff for each A in
Sent, if NA ∈ u, then A ∈ v.
Theorem 8.1. As defined in the extended Definition 5.1 just presented, the initial quintuple
in Mq is a HRxy-frame and Mq as a whole is a HRxy-model.
Proof. See Appendix infra. 
Furthermore, for q and Mq as above and for all A in Sent and u in U , we have the
following extended
Coincidence Lemma 8.2. Mq, [u] ∼ lg, [u] ∼ lat A iff A ∈ u.
Proof. See again Appendix infra. 
Finally, as a consequence of the last two results, we obtain the following
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are extended so as to apply to the new hierarchy of logics HRxy. The pattern of argument
remains the same as in the case of the Rxy: in addition to the results 8.1 and 8.2 we use
Lemma 7.2 (= Lemma 4.2 as extended to HRxy) in the proof.
9. Extending the Rt/Rth logics of historical necessity to dyadic deontic logics of
conditional obligation and permission: Syntax and semantics for the systems
DHRxym
9.1. Syntax of the systems DHRxym
In this and the following sections we deal with an infinite hierarchy DHRxym of logics
combining dyadic deontic modalities with the temporal ones so far studied in this essay,
where, as usual, x, y are any members of the set ω of natural numbers, and where m is any
positive integer with 1m y +1. Those logics are based on a common formal language
obtained by our adding to the vocabulary of the earlier systems HRxy the following items:
(i) A third infinite family of systematic frame constants, viz
{Qk}k=1,2,..., indicating various ‘levels of perfection’; as well as
(ii) a pair of dyadic deontic modalities, O (for conditional obligation) and P (for condi-
tional permission), the readings of which will be considered in a moment.
The definition of the set Sent of well formed sentences of DHRxym is then straightfor-
ward: all the new frame constants will be (atomic) sentences; moreover, whenever A,B
are sentences, so are OBA and PBA.
9.2. Remark on notation for dyadic deontic operators
We write OBA [PBA] in order to render the ordinary language locution “if B , then it
ought to be that A” [“if B , then it is permitted (permissible) that A”]. We prefer this style
of notation to the current one O(A/B) [P(A/B)], because (i) it is parenthesis-free, and
(ii) the reading goes from left to right, and not the other way around.
9.3. Semantics for DHRxym: A general remark
Our presentation of the semantics for DHRxym will differ from the one given in the
cases of Rxy and HRxy in the following crucial respect. In those earlier cases we started
out by defining (1) the notion of a frame, then (2) that of a model (using the concept of a
valuation on a frame), whereupon we gave (3) a recursive definition of the notion of truth
relative to a model, in terms of which, finally, (4) we could characterize the notions of
validity and satisfiability. For reasons that will hopefully appear as we go along, we have
to change the terminology a bit and adopt another order of progression in the present case
of DHRxym: we start out by defining (1) the concept of a structure, which already includes
that of a valuation (on a frame) and which enables us to give (2) a recursive definition of
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model as a special kind of structure, in terms of which (4) we characterize the notions of
validity and satisfiability.
9.4. Semantics for DHRxym: DHRxym-structures
Let x, y ∈ ω and let m be any positive integer with 1  m  y + 1. By a DHRxym-
structure we shall mean a sequence
M = ((U, (u0, e0, n0), ({τi}i∈ω, x), ({wj }j∈ω, y),≈,V ,v),({optk}k=1,2,...,m), {RB}B∈Sent)
where:
(i) The initial septuple is a HRxy-model.
(ii) {optk}k=1,2... is an infinite sequence of subsets of U [to be thought of as representing
levels of perfection], and m is the positive integer  y + 1 under consideration.
(iii) {RB}B∈Sent is a family, indexed by Sent, of binary relations on U .
We can now tell what it means for any sentence A to be true at a time τ ∈
T = {τ0, τ1, . . . , τx} in a history w ∈ W = {w0,w1, . . . ,wy} relative to any DHRxym-
structure M . Our extended truth-definition will contain two fresh clauses, one governing
atomic sentences Qk , and one governing dyadic deontic sentences of the forms OBC and
PBC:
M, τ,w Qk (k = 1,2, . . .) iff
{
f (τ,w) ∈ optk, if 1 k m
τ = τ, otherwise, i.e., if m< k
M, τ,w OBC iff for all w′ in W such that f (τ,w)RBf (τ,w′): M, τ,w′  C
M, τ,w  PBC iff for some w′ in W with f (τ,w)RBf (τ,w′): M, τ,w′  C.
9.5. Semantics for DHRxym: DHRxym-models
We now focus our attention on a special kind of DHRxym-structures called ‘DHRxym-
models’. So by a DHRxym-model we shall mean any DHRxym-structure M , where
{optk},m and {RB} satisfy the following three additional conditions:
δ1 [Exactly m Non-Empty Levels of Perfection]. This condition requires the set {opt1,
opt2, . . . ,optm} to be a partition of U in the sense that
(a) opti ∩ optj = ∅, for all positive integers i, j with 1 i = j m
(b) opt1 ∪ · · · ∪ optm = U
(c) optk = ∅, for each positive integer k with 1 k m
(d) optk = ∅, for each positive integer k with m< k < ω.
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any integer k with 1 k m:
δ2 [Closure of the optk under ∼ lat]. If u ∈ optk and u ∼ latv, then v ∈ optk .
Clearly, δ2 requires each optk with 1 k m to be closed under the relation ∼ lat of
being on the same latitude as.
Our third, crucial condition on DHRxym-models pertains to the indexed family
{RB}B∈Sent; it requires any u,v in U and any sentence B to be such that:
δ3 [Import of the relations RB ]. uRB v iff u ≈ v and M, [v] ∼ lg, [v] ∼ lat  B and for
each z in U with u ≈ z and M , [z] ∼ lg, [z] ∼ lat  B it holds that v z.
Here, the weak preference relation, “is at least as good (ideal) as”, is to be understood
as follows. First of all, by clauses (a) and (b) in the condition δ1 [Exactly m Non-empty
Levels of Perfection], we have that for each u in U there is exactly one positive integer k
with 1 k m such that u ∈ optk . We then define a ‘ranking’ function r from U into the
closed interval [1,m] of integers by setting, for each u in U :
r(u) = the k, with 1 k m, such that u ∈ optk.
Finally, define as the binary relation on U such that for all u,v in U :
u v iff r(u) r(v).
9.6. Validity and satisfiability in DHRxym
Armed with the notion of a DHRxym-model, we then introduce the notions of
DHRxym-validity and DHRxym-satisfiability in the same way as we defined the corre-
sponding notions for the logics Rxy and HRxy. See Section 3 supra.
10. Proof theory for the Rt/Rth logics of historical necessity with conditional
obligation and permission: The axiomatic systems DHRxym
Each axiomatic system in the infinite hierarchy DHRxym (x, y,m ∈ ω, 1m y+1)
still has modus ponens (mp) as its sole primitive rule of inference and Nec (for ) as its
sole primitive rule of proof. In addition to the six groups of axiom schemata A0, A1(a)–(n),
. . . , A4(a)–(f) [Section 4 supra] and A5(a)–(e) [Section 7 supra], DHRxym has a seventh
group of axiom schemata governing the new frame constants Qk (with k = 1,2, . . .) and
the new dyadic deontic modalities O and P , viz. the following:
A6.
(a) Q1 ∨Q2 ∨ · · · ∨Qm
(b) Qi → ¬Qj, for all i, j in ω with 1 i = j < ω
(c) M lgQ1 ∧M lgQ2 ∧ · · · ∧M lgQm
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(e) PBA ↔ ¬OB¬A
(f) OB(A → C) → (OBA → OBC)
(g) OBA → NOBA
(h) NA → OBA
(i) N(A ↔ B) → (OAC ↔ OBC)
(j) OAA
(k) OA∧BC → OA(B → C)
(l) MA → (OAB → PAB)
(m) PAB → (OA(B → C) → OA∧BC)
(n) PAQk → (Qj → ¬A), for all j, k in ω with 1 j < k m
(o) Q1 → (OBA → (B → A))
(p) (Qk ∧OBA∧B ∧ ¬A) → PB(Q1 ∨ · · · ∨Qk−1), for all k in ω
with 1 < k m
(q) Rti−nhjOA → RtihjORti−nA, for all i, n, j ∈ ω with 1 n i  x
and 0 j  y.
The definitions of the notions of provability, deducibility, consistency and maximal consis-
tency for DHRxym are then straightforward.
Soundness Theorem 10.1. The Soundness Theorems 4.1 and 7.1 (both versions) are again
readily extended to the logics DHRxym.
The detailed proof is left to the reader.
Lemma 10.2. In like manner, Lemma 4.2 on our basic two-dimensional temporal log-
ics Rxy with the Rt and Rth operators is extended so as to apply to the new hierarchy
DHRxym. Thus, in the validation of Scott’s Rule for DHRxym [clause (I)] we allow for
the cases where § = N , OB or PB . Moreover, in the extended Lemma 4.2 [clause (II)], we
have the following fresh subclause governing the constants Qk , where Γ is any maximal
DHRxym-consistent set of sentences:
(iii) Qk ∈ Γ , for exactly one positive integer k with 1 k m.
In the proof of this subclause, we appeal to the axiom A6(a) in order to establish exis-
tence, and to axiom A6(b) in order to get uniqueness.
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the following theorem schemata are provable in DHRxym:
T1. ¬Qk, for all positive integers k with m< k < ω
T2. PBA → NPBA
T3. PB(A∨C) ↔ (PBA∨ PBC)
T4. RtihjOBA ↔ RtihjOBRtiA (0 i  x, 0 j  y)
T5. Rti−nhjO(Rti−nhjORtiA → RtihjORtiA) (1 n i  x, 0 j  y).
Proof. Ad T1. Suppose Qk for some k such that m < k < ω. Then, by axiom schema
A6(b), we obtain ¬Q1,¬Q2 and . . . and ¬Qm, whence ¬(Q1 ∨ · · · ∨ Qm), contrary to
axiom A6(a). Hence,  Qk → ⊥ and T1, as desired.
Ad T2. We first obtain MPBA → PBA by contraposing A6(g), and then NMPBA →
NPBA by familiar S5-principles [axiom schema A5(c) in Section 7]. Since by A5(c) we
also get PBA → NMPBA, the desired result T2 is immediate.
Ad T3. Immediate by axioms A6(e), (f) and (h) together with the underlying logic of N .
Ad T4. Exercise (easy, though somewhat tedious). Use inter alia A4(d)!
Ad T5. Assuming Rti−nhjORtiA, we obtain by A6(q) RtihjORti−nRtiA, and
by T7 in Lemma 4.3 supra [enabling us to reduce the compound Rti−nRti to Rti ]
RtihjORtiA. So we get  Rti−nhjORtiA → RtihjORtiA by the Deduction The-
orem for DHRxym. Applying the easily derived rule of proof:
from  A to infer  Rti−nhjOA (1 n i  x, 0 j  y)
to this last result, the desired conclusion T5 is immediate. 
Remark 1. The above theorem schemata T1–T3 will be explicitly appealed to in the proof
of Theorem 11.2 infra, which is an essential ingredient in our Completeness Theorem 11.3
for the systems DHRxym; see appendix. More precisely, we use them in showing that the
canonical DHRxym-structure Mq [Section 11 infra] is indeed a DHRxym-model in the
sense of satisfying the characteristic conditions δ1–δ3 in the semantics for those systems.
Remark 2. The theorem schemata T4 and T5 are DHRxym-analogues of the axioms AOt1
and AOt2, respectively, in Bailhache [9, Ch. IV, p. 81]. Note that neither T5 nor A6(q) can
be strengthened by replacing O by OB (with arbitrary formula B) in those schemata.
Remark 3. We observe that the axiom A6(c) can be—prima facie—weakened as follows:
A6(c′) ♦Q1 ∧♦Q2 ∧ · · · ∧♦Qm.
However, using axiom schemata A4(b)–(c) [Section 4 supra] together with A6(d), we eas-
ily derive our original formulation A6(c) from A6(c′). The derivation is left to the reader
as an exercise. Thus, the two formulations are in effect equivalent in the axiomatics for
DHRxym.
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following theorem schemata are provable in DHRxym:
T6. A → NA;A → OBA, provided that A contains no occurrences of the operators
Rti,N
lat, or M lat, or of any frame constants bj (0 j < ω) or Qk (1 k < ω).
T7. (NA∨N¬A) → (OA ↔ A)
T8. NA∨N¬A, where A satisfies the proviso of T6
T9. OA ↔ A, where A satisfies the proviso of T6
T10. OBA ↔ (B → OA), where B satisfies the same proviso
T11. OBA ↔ O(B → A), where B satisfies the same proviso
T12. (B → OA) ↔ O(B → A), where B satisfies the same proviso.
Proof. Ad T6. Easily handled in the spirit of the proof of T7 in Lemma 7.4(III) supra.
Ad T7. For NA → (OA ↔ A), use A0, A5(c) and A6(h). For N¬A → (OA ↔ A),
use A5(c), A6(h), A6(l) [relying on  M] and A6(e).
Ad T8. Use A0 and T6 supra.
Ad T9. Immediate from T7 and T8.
Ad T10. For the left-to-right direction, assume OBA and B , where B satisfies the
proviso of T6 [containing no occurrences etc.]. Then NB by T6 as well as N(B ↔ )
by A5(c). Hence, OBA ↔ OA by A6(i), so OA and B → OA by A0. For the right-to-
left direction, make the counter-assumption that (B → OA) together with PB¬A, where
B still satisfies the proviso at issue. We then leave to the reader the task of showing that
this counter-assumption implies the contradiction that N¬B ∧MB .
Ad T11. For the left-to-right direction, make the counter-assumption that OBA ∧
P(B ∧ ¬A). Show that MB follows from the second conjunct, and that OA follows
from the first one [the proviso gives us  MB → B and  B → (OA ↔ OBA)], whence
O(B → A) contrary to the second conjunct. The opposite direction is handled in the same
spirit. Note that the axiom schema A6(j) is used in the proof of both directions!
Ad T12. Immediate from T10 and T11. 
11. Semantic completeness of the logics DHRxym
11.1. Preliminaries: Generated canonical DHRxym-structures
We begin by extending Definition 5.1. For any natural numbers x, y,m ∈ ω with 1 
m y + 1, let ΩDHRxym be the set of all maximal DHRxym-consistent sets of sentences.
Let q be a fixed element of ΩDHRxym. Define the canonical DHRxym-structure generated
by q as the sequence
Mq = ((U, (u0, e0, n0), ({τi}i∈ω, x), ({wj }j∈ω, y),≈,V ,v),({optk}k=1,2...,m), {RB}B∈Sent)
where
446 L. Åqvist / Journal of Applied Logic 3 (2005) 421–460(i) U = {u ∈ ΩDHRxym: for each A in Sent, if A ∈ q, then A ∈ u}
and where the remaining conditions (ii)–(vi) in Definition 5.1 now apply to U in this new
sense and to the richer set Sent of sentences in our expanded language of DHRxym. Simi-
larly for the condition (iv ≈) stated in the Preliminaries to Section 8 above, which condition
is still assumed to govern the equivalence relation ≈. Furthermore, we must define the re-
maining items in Mq :
(vii) optk = {u ∈ U : Qk ∈ u} (k = 1,2, . . .)
(viii) m is the third natural number under consideration.
Finally, as to the indexed family {RB}, we require each B in Sent to satisfy:
(ix) RB = the binary relation on U such that for all u,v in U :
u RB v iff for all A in Sent: if OBA ∈ u, then A ∈ v.
Moreover, for canonical DHRxym-structures (generated by q ∈ U ) as just defined by
conditions (i)–(iv), (iv ≈), (v)–(ix), we introduce the ranking function r from U into the
closed interval [1,m] of integers by setting, for each u in U :
r(u) = the k, with 1 k m, such that Qk ∈ u.
This definition of r is clearly justified by our fresh subclause (iii) in Lemma 10.2(II).
Again, is the binary relation on U such that for all u,v in U :
u v iff r(u) r(v).
Having gone through these preliminaries, we now state two basic results on generated
canonical DHRxym-structures. However, the order of presentation will be reversed as com-
pared with the one adopted in Sections 5 and 8 supra, and similarly for their proofs given
below in the appendix. The reason for this reversal will again become apparent in the ap-
pendix.
Coincidence Lemma 11.1. Let q be any fixed maximal DHRxym-consistent set of sen-
tences, and let Mq , as just defined, be the canonical DHRxym-structure generated by q .
Then, for each sentence A and each u in U :
Mq, [u] ∼ lg, [u] ∼ lat A iff A ∈ u.
Proof. By induction on the length of A. For details, see Appendix infra. 
Theorem 11.2. As just defined, Mq is a DHRxym-model.
Proof. See again Appendix infra. 
As a consequence of the two basic results just stated, we obtain the desired
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rems 5.4 and 8.3 are extended so as to apply to the new hierarchy of logics DHRxym.
Proof. The pattern of argument remains the same as in the case of the Rxy and the HRxy:
just use right Lemmata/Theorems! 
Appendix. Proofs
In the context of this appendix, we need the following useful
Preparatory Lemma. Let Mq be as in Definition 5.1, and let i, j be any natural numbers
with 0 i  x and 0 j  y. Then:
(i) The set {A ∈ Sent: RtihjA ∈ q} is a member of U .
(ii) For all u,v in U and all sentences A: A ∈ u iff A ∈ v.
(iii) For all u in U : (u ∈ τi iff ai ∈ u) and (u ∈ wj iff bj ∈ u).
(iv) The set {A ∈ Sent: RtihjA ∈ q} belongs both to τi and to wj , i.e., to τi ∩wj .
Proof. For clause (i), we have to prove that {A: RtihjA ∈ q} is
(a) Rxy-consistent (or, for short, consistent),
(b) maximal in the sense of being negation-complete, and
(c) ‘q-adequate’ in the sense that for all A in Sent, if A ∈ q , then A ∈ {A: RtihjA ∈ q}.
Ad (a). Make the counter-assumption that {A: RtihjA ∈ q}  ⊥, i.e., is not consis-
tent. Using Scott’s Rule for Rxy [Lemma 4.2(I)] with § = Rtihj , we readily obtain that
q  Rtihj⊥. On the other hand, by the rule Nec and axiom schemata under A2, we also
obtain that q  ¬Rtihj⊥. But these two results contradict the consistency of q (q ∈ Ωxy).
Hence, {A: RtihjA ∈ q} is consistent. (Here and henceforth we write simply ‘’ instead
of ‘Rxy ’.)
Ad (b). The counter-assumption here means that, for some sentence B , we have
RtihjB /∈ q as well as Rtihj¬B /∈ q . By the maximal consistency of q we then obtain
¬RtihjB ∈ q as well as ¬Rtihj¬B ∈ q , whence RtihjB ∈ q by axiom schema A2(d),
contrary to the consistency of q . Hence, {A: RtihjA ∈ q} is maximal.
Ad (c). Suppose A ∈ q . By the maximal consistency of q , every instance of A2(a) is
in q , so that RtihjA ∈ q , as desired (since q is closed under modus ponens).
Again, for clause (ii), just appeal to the S5-properties of the universal operator [axiom
schema A4(c)]!
For clause (iii), we argue as follows. Beginning with the first conjunct inside the quan-
tifier, we consider the left-to-right direction and assume that u ∈ τi . Letting, by way of
abbreviation, ui = {A: Rtih0A ∈ q}, this assumption means that u ∼ lgui . By axiom
schemata A1(b) and A2(b), we have Rtih0(ai ∧ b0) and Rtih0ai as members of q . Hence,
ai ∈ ui and, by A1(m), N lgai ∈ ui . Then ai ∈ u (since ui ∼ lgu), as desired.
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assumption that for some u in U : ai ∈ u, while u /∈ τi , i.e., it is not the case that u ∼ lgui ,
i.e., there is a sentence B such that
N lgB ∈ u, but B /∈ ui so that instead ¬B ∈ ui.
Therefore, by A1(b), we have ai ∧ b0 ∧ ¬B ∈ ui , whence Rtih0¬B ∈ ui by A1(a).
Hence, Rtih0¬B ∈ ui , by A2(c). Again, since both ui and u are in U , clause (ii) gives
us Rtih0¬B ∈ u as well, whence, by A4(c), Rtih0¬B ∈ u. On the other hand, as we
have both ai ∈ u and N lgB ∈ u, we get, by A4(d), RtihjB ∈ u for each j with 0 j  y,
whence, in particular, Rtih0B ∈ u; so, by A2(e), ¬Rtih0¬B ∈ u. But this contradicts the
consistency of u (u ∈ U). Hence, the desired right-to-left direction in the first conjunct.
The two directions in the second conjunct inside the quantifier in clause (iii) are proved
in a perfectly parallel fashion.
For clause (iv), let (by way of abbreviation) uij = {A: RtihjA ∈ q}, ui0 = {A: Rtih0A ∈
q}, and u0j = {A: Rt0hjA ∈ q}. We first prove that uij ∈ τi . Suppose not, i.e., that uij /∈ τi .
This means that it is not the case that ui0 ∼ lguij . By the definition of τi and A4(c),
ui0 ∈ τi , so ai ∈ ui0 (by clause (iii) of this Preparatory Lemma). Also, by the counter-
assumption, there is a sentence B such that N lgB ∈ ui0, but B /∈ uij so that ¬B ∈ uij .
Hence, having (ai ∧ N lgB) ∈ ui0, we obtain by A4(d) that RtihkB ∈ ui0 for all k with
0  k  y, whence, in particular, RtihjB ∈ ui0. Also, by A2(c), RtihjB ∈ ui0. Again,
both ui0 and q are in U , so RtihjB ∈ q (by clause (ii)), RtihjB ∈ q and B ∈ uij . But,
already having ¬B ∈ uij , this contradicts the consistency of uij (uij ∈ U by clause (i)).
The proof that uij ∈ wj is done in a parallel fashion, letting now the set u0j play the
role of ui0. Left to the reader.
This completes the proof of the Preparatory Lemma. 
Proof of Theorem 5.2. We must first show that, on Definition 5.1, the initial quadruple
in Mq is a Rxy-frame in the sense of satisfying the requirements (i)–(vi) given in Section 3
supra. And this can be left to the reader. So we know that the initial quadruple in Mq is a
Rxy-frame. Finally, the verification that Mq as a whole is a Rxy-model is then immediate
by conditions (v) and (vi) in Definition 5.1. 
In order to pave the way for our next proof (that of the Coincidence Lemma 5.3), we
make the following preliminary
Observation. Knowing Mq to satisfy the requirement (v) on Rxy-frames given in Sec-
tion 3 supra, we define the following function f from T ×W into U . For all i, j ∈ ω with
0 i  x and 0 j  y:
f (τi,wj ) = the u in U : {u} = τi ∩wj (i.e., f (τi,wj )
= the sole member of τi ∩wj).
See also Section 6 supra. The function f is then seen to be such that for all i, j under
consideration:
(i) f (τi,wj ) = {A: RtihjA ∈ q} (= uij )
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(iii) f (τi,wj ) ∈ τi and f (τi,wj ) ∈ wj
(iv) For all sentences B: B ∈ f (τi,wj ) iff RtihjB ∈ f (τi,wj ).
Furthermore, letting [0, x] (= {i ∈ ω: 0  i  x}) and [0, y] (= {j ∈ ω: 0  j  y}) be
closed intervals of integers in the usual way, we set for any u in U :
α(u) = the i in [0, x] such that ai ∈ u
β(u) = the j in [0, y] such that bj ∈ u.
These definitions are justified by our axiom schemata A1(d)–(g). Think of α/β/ as the
function which to each member of U assigns an integer as its longitude/latitude/number.
We list some obvious properties of α and β:
(v) aαu ∈ u (writing ‘αu’ instead of ‘α(u)’)
(vi) bβu ∈ u (similarly)
(vii) αu = αv iff u ∼ lgv
(viii) βu = βv iff u ∼ latv
(ix) ταu = [u] ∼ lg and wβu = [u] ∼ lat.
Proof. Ad (i). The counter-assumption to (i) means that for some sentence B we have
RtihjB ∈ q , while ¬B ∈ f (τi,wj ). Since both q and f (τi,wj ) belong to U , we ob-
tain RtihjB ∈ f (τi,wj ) [use A2(c), A4(c) and clause (ii) in the Preparatory Lemma].
Again, by the definition of f , we have that f (τi,wj ) belongs both to τi and to wj . Us-
ing clause (iii) of the Preparatory Lemma, we then get (ai ∧ bj ∧ ¬B) ∈ f (τi,wj ), so
that, by A1(a), Rtihj¬B ∈ f (τi,wj ). However, this result is easily seen to contradict
RtihjB ∈ f (τi,wj ), whence our desired clause (i).
Ad (ii). As usual, we set (by way of definitional abbreviation) uij = {A: RtihjA ∈ q}
for all i, j with 0  i  x and 0  j  y. The counter-assumption to (ii) means that, for
some u in U , u ∈ τi and it is not the case that u ∼ lgf (τi,wj ). In other words, u ∼ lgui0
[definition of τi ], and it is not the case that u ∼ lguij [clause (i) of this Observation]. On
the other hand, we have ui0 ∼ lguij [see the proof of the Preparatory Lemma: clause (iv)],
whence u ∼ lguij by A4(c). Contradiction. The proof of the second half of the present
clause is done in a parallel fashion, letting u0j play the role of ui0.
Ad (iii). Immediate by the definition of f .
Ad (iv). Use this Observation: clause (i) and the Preparatory Lemma: clause (ii) together
with the definition of uij (= {A: RtihjA ∈ q}) and the fact that q and f (τi,wj ) both
belong to U .
Ad (v)–(ix). Left to the reader. 
Proof of the Coincidence Lemma 5.3. We are to show that, for each sentence A and
each u in U :
Mq, [u] ∼ lg, [u] ∼ lat A iff A ∈ u.
The proof is by induction on the length of A and runs as follows.
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tematic frame constant ai with i any natural number in ω, or (e) some bj with j ∈ ω.
Case (a): A = p ∈ Prop. Using the function f as defined in the Observation supra, we
can now simplify our characterization of the valuation V in Definition 5.1 as follows. For
all p in Prop:
V (p) = {(τi,wj ): 0 i  x, 0 j  y and p ∈ f (τi,wj )}.
The present case is then handled in the following way:
Mq, [u] ∼ lg, [u] ∼ lat  p iff ([u] ∼ lg, [u] ∼ lat) ∈ V (p)
iff p ∈ f ([u] ∼ lg, [u] ∼ lat) iff p ∈ u.
In this chain of equivalences, the first ‘iff’ holds by virtue of the truth condition for p, the
second by our simplified definition of V , and the third by the fact that u is the sole member
of the intersection [u] ∼ lg∩[u] ∼ lat.
The two cases (b) and (c) are immediate. We then deal with
Case (d): A = ai , for some i ∈ ω.
Subcase 0 i  x.
For the left-to-right direction, assume that Mq , [u] ∼ lg, [u] ∼ lat  ai . By the truth
condition for ai we then obtain that [u] ∼ lg = τi . Clearly, u ∈ [u] ∼ lg, so u ∈ τi . Hence,
by clause (iii) of the Preparatory Lemma, ai ∈ u, i.e. the desired result. For the right-
to-left direction, assume that ai ∈ u. Now, by clause (iii), u ∈ τi . By the definition of τi
(Definition 5.1, condition (iii)) we then get that u ∼ lg{A: Rtih0A ∈ q}. Hence, by an
elementary property of equivalence relations, we have [u] ∼ lg = [{A: Rtih0A ∈ q}] ∼
lg = τi (by definition). Therefore, by the truth condition for ai , we obtain the desired result
that Mq, [u] ∼ lg, [u] ∼ lat  ai .
Subcase x < i < ω. Here we have Mq , [u] ∼ lg, [u] ∼ lat  ai by the truth condition
for ai , as well as ai /∈ u by A1(h). Hence the desired result in this subcase.
Case (e): A = bj , for some j ∈ ω. This case, with its two subcases, is handled in a
similar fashion: use the truth condition for bj together with clause (iii) of the Preparatory
Lemma, or A1(k), as the subcase may be.
Induction step. The cases where A is a Boolean compound are left to the reader. Con-
sider next
Case A = RtihjB (for some sentence B and some i, j ∈ ω).
Subcase 0 i  x and 0 j  y. The case will be resolved if we establish the following
chain of five equivalences:
Mq, [u] ∼ lg, [u] ∼ lat RtihjB iff Mq, τi,wj  B
iff Mq, [f (τi,wj )] ∼ lg, [f (τi,wj )] ∼ lat  B
iff B ∈ f (τi,wj )
iff RtihjB ∈ f (τi,wj )
iff RtihjB ∈ u.
Here, the first ‘iff’ is guaranteed by the truth condition for RtihjB , the second by clause (ii)
in our Observation supra, the third by the inductive hypothesis, the fourth by clause (iv) in
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A2(c) and A4(c) together with the fact that both u and f (τi,wj ) are in U .
Subcase x < i or y < j . Here, the truth condition for RtihjB will be vacuously sat-
isfied: it tells us that Mq , [u] ∼ lg, [u] ∼ lat  RtihjB for any sentence B whatsoever,
including ⊥. In like manner, we have RtihjB ∈ u for any sentence B , including ⊥, when-
ever x < i or y < j (by virtue of A1(c)). Hence the desired result also in the present
subcase.
Case A = RtiB (for some B in Sent and some i ∈ ω). Recalling our definitions of the
functions α and β in the Observation supra as well as its clauses (v)–(ix), we consider
Subcase 0  i  x. The case is taken care of by the following chain of eleven equiva-
lences:
Mq, [u] ∼ lg, [u] ∼ lat RtiB iff Mq, ταu,wβu RtiB
iff Mq, ταu,wβu RtihjB, for some j with 0 j  y and wβu = wj
iff Mq, ταu,wβu RtihjB, for some j with 0 j  y and βu = j
iff Mq, τi,wj  B for some j with 0 j  y and βu = j
iff Mq, [f (τi,wj )] ∼ lg, [f (τi,wj )] ∼ lat  B for some j with 0 j  y
and βu = j
iff B ∈ f (τi,wj ) for some j with 0 j  y and βu = j
iff RtihjB ∈ f (τi,wj ) for some j with 0 j  y and βu = j
iff RtihjB ∈ u for some j with 0 j  y and βu = j
iff (bj ∧RtihjB) ∈ u, for some j with 0 j  y and βu = j
iff
∨
0jy
(bj ∧RtihjB) ∈ u
iff RtiB ∈ u.
Here, the first ‘iff’ is immediate by our above Observation: clause (ix), the second follows
from our re-formulated truth condition for RtiB (see the Remark under the truth definition
given in Section 3 supra), and the third by the obvious one-one correspondence between
the sets W and [0, y]. The fourth ‘iff’ then follows by the truth condition for RtihjB . The
subsequent four ‘iff’s are motivated just as in Case A = RtihjB above, using standard first
order logic of existential quantification. Again, the nine-th ‘iff’ goes through by virtue of
the fact that bβu ∈ u (clause (vi) in the Observation supra), whence bj ∈ u (since βu = j ).
The tenth ‘iff’ is immediate by the fact that the upper member of the equivalence involves
existential quantification over a finite set (the closed interval of integers [0, y]), which can
clearly be expanded as the finite disjunction appearing in the lower member of that equiv-
alence. Finally, for the eleventh and last ‘iff’, use the “definitional” axiom schema A3(a)!
Subcase x < i. Here, the truth condition for RtiB tells us that Mq , [u] ∼ lg, [u] ∼ lat 
RtiB for any sentence B , including ⊥; similarly, we have RtiB ∈ u for any sentence B ,
including ⊥, whenever x < i (by virtue of A3(b)). Hence the desired result in this subcase
as well.
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Mq, [u] ∼ lg, [u] ∼ lat N latB
iff Mq, τi,wβu(= [u] ∼ lat)  B, for each i in [0, x]
iff Mq, [f (τi,wβu)] ∼ lg, [f (τi,wβu)] ∼ lat  B for each i in [0, x]
iff B ∈ f (τi,wβu) for each i in [0, x]
iff RtihβuB ∈ f (τi,wβu) for each i in [0, x]
iff RtihβuB ∈ f (τi,wβu) for each i in [0, x]
iff
∧
0ix
(RtihβuB) ∈ q
iff 
( ∧
0ix
RtihβuB
)
∈ q,u
iff
∧
0ix
RtihβuB ∈ u
iff N latB ∈ u.
Here, the first ‘iff’ holds by virtue of the truth condition for N latB , the second by our
Observation: clause (ii) supra, the third by the inductive hypothesis, the fourth by the Ob-
servation: clause (iv), and the fifth by axiom schemata A2(c) and A4(c). The sixth ‘iff’ then
follows by repeated applications of the Preparatory Lemma: clause (ii) and by representing
finite universal quantification as finite conjunction. The seventh ‘iff’ is immediate by ax-
iom schema A4(c) and the Preparatory Lemma: clause (ii), q and u both being in U . Again,
the eighth ‘iff’ in the above chain results from axiom schemata A2(c) and A4(c). Finally,
the Observation: clause (vi) tells us that we have always bβu ∈ u, whence the nine-th ‘iff’
is immediate by A4(e).
Case A = N lgB . As the validation of this case parallels that of the preceding one, it can
be left to the reader. For instance, use the Observation: clause (v) in the place of clause (vi)
as well as axiom schema A4(d)!
Case A =B . The case is handled in the same spirit as the two previous ones and can
also be left to the reader. The “definitional” axiom schema A4(f) is crucial in the validation.
The proof of the present Coincidence Lemma is complete (leaving the dual Cases A =
M latB,M lgB and ♦B to the reader). 
Proof of Theorem 8.1. We first show that, on the extended Definition 5.1, the initial
quintuple in Mq is a HRxy-frame.This task then amounts to showing that, as defined by
(iv ≈), ≈ is an equivalence relation on U which satisfies (C1≈), (C2≈) and (C3≈). Axiom
schema A5(c) familiarly entails that ≈ is an equivalence relation on U .
Ad (C1≈). The validation of this condition is immediate by virtue of axiom schema
A5(a).
Ad (C2≈). The validation is likewise immediate by A5(b).
Ad (C3≈) [characteristic tree-generating condition]. We must handle this requirement
carefully in some detail. First of all, we need the following
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in the axiom A5(e) and was defined in Section 7 supra [Def.w]. Let the nth power wn of w
be recursively defined by setting, for any natural number n 0, w0A = A and wn+1A =
wwnA. Then, all instances of the following theorem schemata are provable in HRxy +
Def.w:
T1. Rti−nhjA ↔ RtihjwnA, for all integers i, n such that 1 n i  x
and for all integers j with 0 j  y.
T2. wnNA → NwnA, for all integers n with 1 n < ω.
T3. ai → (wnA → ¬wn¬A), for all integers n with 1 n i  x.
Proof. Ad T1. Elementary, but somewhat tedious, exercise in HRxy + Def.w, in fact al-
ready in Rxy + Def.w. Hint: Start with the case n = 1. For each direction in T1, make the
relevant counter-assumption to its being provable and try to derive a contradiction from
that assumption. It turns out that the definitional expansion (by means of Def.w) of the
formula wA, or of its negation, can in each case be reduced so as to yield the desired
result. Our axiom schemata A1(b), A1(f)–(g) and those under A2 are helpful in the deriva-
tions, e.g., by enabling us to eliminate inconsistent disjuncts, or otherwise. The proof in
the remaining cases (if any) where n > 1 proceeds in a analogous fashion.
Ad T2. This theorem schema is obtained by a straightforward induction on n. The basis
n = 1 is provided by axiom schema A5(e). As for the induction step, assume the inductive
hypothesis to the effect that  wnNA → NwnA. We then get  w(wnNA → NwnA) by
the derived rule of w-necessitation [i.e., ‘from  A to infer  wA’; see Lemma 7.3 supra],
so
 wn+1NA → wNwnA → Nwn+1A
by the theorem schema
w(A → B) → (wA → wB) [= T3 in Lemma 7.3 supra]
and another application of A5(e); which result completes the induction.
Ad T3. The case where n = 1 is already taken care of by T2 in Lemma 7.3. And the
remaining cases (if any) where n > 1 are handled in a similar spirit. 
We are now in a position to deal with (C3≈), i.e., we are to show that, as defined by
(iv ≈), ≈ is such that for all integers i, k with 0  k < i  x and all integers j,m with
0 j,m y:
If f (τi,wj ) ≈ f (τi,wm), then f (τk,wj ) ≈ f (τk,wm).
Suppose then, contrary to (C3 ≈), that some integers i, k with 0  k < i  x and some
j,m with 0 j,m y are such that
1. f (τi,wj ) ≈ f (τi,wm), whilst
2. not: f (τk,wj ) ≈ f (τk,wm)
}
counter-assumption
Then:
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¬B ∈ f (τk,wm), for some B in Sent from 2 by the definition of ≈
3, Observation: clause (i)
as k < i, k = i − n, for some
such n
4. RtkhjNB ∈ q and Rtkhm¬B ∈ q, for ‘that’ B
5. Rti−nhjNB ∈ q and Rti−nhm¬B ∈ q, for some n
with 1 n i
6. RtihjwnNB ∈ q and Rtihmwn¬B ∈ q, for ‘that’ n from 5 by T1
6, T2, A2(a)–(b) etc., Observ: (i)
1,7, definition of ≈, Observ: (i)
8, A1(b), T3, A2(a)–(b) etc.
7. RtihjNwnB ∈ q [amounting to NwnB ∈ f (τi,wj )]
8. RtihmwnB ∈ q [amounting to wnB ∈ f (τi,wm)]
9. Rtihm¬wn¬B ∈ q
where 9 and the second conjunct in 6 are easily seen to contradict the consistency of q .
Hence the desired result.
Remark. We observe here that an alternative proof to the same effect, i.e., that ≈ satisfies
(C3≈) on the definition (iv≈), can be obtained by our using the axiom schema A5(f) in-
stead of A5(e) and its corollaries. The new, alternative proof is identical to the one given
above down to and including line 5, from where it continues as follows:
6′. RtihjNRti−nB ∈ q
[amounting to NRti−nB ∈ f (τi,wj )] 5 [1st conjunct],A5(f)
7′. RtihmRti−nB ∈ q
[amounting to Rti−nB ∈ f (τi,wm)] 1,6′, Observation: clause (i)
8′. Rtihm(bm ∧Rti−nB) ∈ q 7′, A1(b), A2(b) etc.
9′. Rtihm(Rti−nhmB) ∈ q 8′, T0 in Lemma 4.3, A2(b) etc.
10. Rti−nhmB ∈ q
[amounting to B ∈ f (τi−n,wm)] 9′, A2(a–e), A4(c) etc.
where 10 and the second conjunct in 5 contradict the consistency of q .
In order to finish the proof of Theorem 8.1 we must also show that the canonical HRxy-
structure Mq as a whole is a HRxy-model. It suffices then to establish that, on the extended
Definition 5.1, the valuation V satisfies the new condition (C4≈).
Ad (C4≈). Suppose for any p in Prop and any u,v in U that u ≈ v and ([u] ∼ lg, [u] ∼
lat) ∈ V (p). Then p ∈ u(= f ([u] ∼ lg, [u] ∼ lat)) by the definition of V , whence Np ∈ u
by A5(d), and p ∈ v (= f ([v] ∼ lg, [v] ∼ lat)) by the definition of ≈. So ([v] ∼ lg, [v] ∼
lat) ∈ V (p), as desired. The opposite direction is then immediate by the symmetry in U
of ≈.
The proof of Theorem 8.1 is complete. 
Proof of the Coincidence Lemma 8.2. Only the two new cases A = NB and A = MB
(arising in the induction step) have to be considered. A standard Makinson–Lemmon–
Scott argument will then be helpful. For instance, when adapted to case A = MB , such an
argument runs as follows, in outline:
Mq, [u] ∼ lg, [u] ∼ lat MB
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with f ([u] ∼ lg, [u] ∼ lat) ≈ f ([u] ∼ lg,w)
iff Mq, [f ([u] ∼ lg,w)] ∼ lg, [f ([u] ∼ lg,w)] ∼ lat  B, for some w in W
with f ([u] ∼ lg, [u] ∼ lat) ≈ f ([u] ∼ lg,w)
iff B ∈ f ([u] ∼ lg,w), for some w in W
with f ([u] ∼ lg, [u] ∼ lat) ≈ f ([u] ∼ lg,w)
iff MB ∈ u(= f ([u] ∼ lg, [u] ∼ lat)).
In this chain, the first ‘iff’ holds by virtue of the truth condition for MB , the second by
our Observation: clause (ii) supra, and the third by the inductive hypothesis; whereas the
‘if’ half of the fourth ‘iff’ requires some argument (the ‘only if’ half is immediate by the
definition of ≈ in Mq ). So we assume that MB ∈ u and consider the set of sentences
Γ = {C ∈ Sent: NC ∈ u} ∪ {B}
and prove (i) that Γ is HRxy-consistent, (ii) that its Lindenbaum extension Γω belongs
to U , (iii) that u ≈ Γω, and hence (iv) that u ∼ lgΓω by (C1≈). Then we take [Γω] ∼ lat as
the desired w in W and observe that, since B ∈ Γω, B ∈ f ([Γω] ∼ lg, [Γω] ∼ lat), whence
B ∈ f ([u] ∼ lg,w), because [u] ∼ lg = [Γω] ∼ lg (by the result (iv)) and w = [Γω] ∼ lat.
So the case is established. Case A = NB is handled in the same spirit.
The proof of the present Coincidence Lemma is complete. 
Proof of the Coincidence Lemma 11.1. We have the following new case in the induction
basis:
Case A = Qk , for some positive integer k.
Subcase 1 k m.
Here, we have the following chain of equivalences:
Mq, [u] ∼ lg, [u] ∼ lat Qk iff f ([u] ∼ lg, [u] ∼ lat) ∈ optk
iff u ∈ optk iff Qk ∈ u
where the first “iff” holds by virtue of the truth condition for Qk in the present subcase,
the second by the definition of the function f , and the third by the definition of optk in
canonical DHRxym-structures [condition (vii)]. Hence the desired result in this subcase.
Subcase m< k < ω.
Here, we get Mq , [u] ∼ lg, [u] ∼ lat Qk by the truth condition for Qk in the present
subcase, and Qk /∈ u by T1 in Lemma 10.3, whence the desired result in this subcase as
well.
In the induction step we only have to consider the two new cases A = OB and A = PB .
Relying on a standard Makinson–Lemmon–Scott argument (see the proof of the preceding
Coincidence Lemma 8.2 supra), we easily obtain the desired results in these two new
cases. 
Proof of Theorem 11.2. We are to show that, on the definition given in Section 11, the
canonical DHRxym-structure Mq is a DHRxym-model. First of all, then, we verify that
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rems 5.2 and 8.1 apply to this initial septuple without any change.
Secondly, we show that {optk} and m satisfy the requirements δ1 and δ2. As far as
δ1 is concerned, this amounts to showing that the set {opt1,opt2, . . . ,optm} is a partition
of U in the sense of satisfying conditions (a)–(d) in δ1 [Exactly m Non-empty Levels of
Perfection].
Ad (a). By the definition of optk in canonical DHRxym-structures [Section 11, condi-
tion (vii)], the counter-assumption to (a) implies that, for some integers i, j with 1 i =
j m and some u in U , we have both Qi ∈ u and Qj ∈ u. But, by axiom schema A6(b),
this contradicts the consistency of u (∈ U).
Ad (b). The non-trivial task is to show that U is a subset of opt1 ∪ · · · ∪ optm. Suppose
that it is not. Then, for some u in U , we have u /∈ opt1 and . . . and u /∈ optm, whence, by
the definition of optk [Section 11, condition (vii)], Q1 /∈ u and . . . and Qm /∈ u. Hence, by
the maximal consistency of u, we get (¬Q1 ∧ · · · ∧¬Qm) ∈ u, which is impossible by the
fact that our axiom A6(a) [Q1 ∨ · · · ∨Qm] is in u.
Ad (c). The counter-assumption to (c) asserts that some positive integer k with 1 
k  m is such that for all u in U : Qk /∈ u. On the other hand, for any u in U we have
M lgQk ∈ u, by the axiom A6(c). So, by a standard Makinson–Lemmon–Scott argument
applied to the present case, there exists a member v of U with u ∼ lgv and Qk ∈ v. This
contradiction reduces the counter-assumption to (c) ad absurdum.
Ad (d). The counter-assumption to (d) asserts, by the definition of optk , that for some
positive integer with m < k < ω there is an element u in U such that Qk ∈ u. However,
by T1 in Lemma 10.3, we also get ¬Qk ∈ u, contrary to the consistency of u.
Having dealt with δ1, we must next show that Mq satisfies the requirement δ2 on
DHRxym-models, to the effect that each optk with 1  k  m is closed under the re-
lation ∼ lat. So assume u ∈ optk , i.e., Qk ∈ u, and u ∼ latv, i.e., that for each A in
Sent: if N latA ∈ u, then A ∈ v by our extended Definition 5.1 in Section 11]. By axiom
schema A6(d), we then obtain N latQk ∈ u, so Qk ∈ v and v ∈ optk , as desired.
Our final task is to verify that the relations {RB} in Mq satisfy the crucial, character-
istic condition δ3 [Import of the relations RB ] on DHRxym-models. The proof will inter
alia illustrate the usefulness of such axiom schemata as A6(g), (h), (j) and A6(n)–(p). In
the proof we shall use &, ⊃,≡,∀,∃ etc. as metalinguistic shorthands with their familiar
meanings and use ‘u’, ‘v’, ‘z’ as variables over U . Moreover, as usual, ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ are
used as variables ranging over Sent. We are then to establish:
δ3. uRB v iff u ≈ v and Mq, [v] ∼ lg, [v] ∼ lat  B and for each z in U with u ≈ z and
Mq, [z] ∼ lg, [z] ∼ lat  B it holds that v z.
Left-to-right. The obvious way of proving δ3 in this direction is to give three separate
subproofs, each showing that a relevant conjunct in the right member of δ3 is implied by
its left member.
First subproof : Assume for any B in Sent and any u,v in U :
L. Åqvist / Journal of Applied Logic 3 (2005) 421–460 4571. uRB v(≡ ∀C(OBC ∈ u ⊃ C ∈ v)) hypothesis
Then:
2. NA ∈ u hypothesis (for showing that u ≈ v)
2, A6(h), u maximal consistent since u ∈ U
from 1 and 3 by the definition of RB in Mq and
universal instantiation
3. OBA ∈ u
4. A ∈ v
5. 1 ⊃ (2 ⊃ 4) by the deduction theorem (Ded Th) twice
from 5 by universal generalization (on A),
quantification theory (QT) and the definition of ≈
in Mq
6. uRB v ⊃ u ≈ v
Here, 6 = Q.E.D.
Second subproof :
1. uRB v hypothesis
2. ∀C (OBC ∈ u ⊃ C ∈ v) 1, definition of RB in Mq
3. OBB ∈ u A6(j)
4. B ∈ v 2, 3, QT
5. Mq, [v] ∼ lg, [v] ∼ lat  B 4, Coincidence Lemma 11.1
6. 1 ⊃ 5 from the deduction 1–5 by DedTh
where 6 = Q.E.D.
Third subproof :
We begin by noticing the useful facts that Qr(u) ∈ u, and that Qi ∈ u iff r(u) = i (for all
u ∈ U and all integers i with 1 i m); they are immediate by the definition of r in Mq .
1. uRB v hypothesis
2. ∃z (u ≈ z&B ∈ z& r(v) > r(z)) hypothesis to be reduced ad absurdum
Then assume:
3. u ≈ z&B ∈ z& r(v) > r(z) hypothesis for existential instantiation
Let r(v) = k and r(z) = j (1 j, k m):
4. Qk ∈ v &Qj ∈ z& k > j 3, useful facts
5. PBQk ∈ v or ¬PBQk ∈ v v max cons since v ∈ U
6. PBQk ∈ v hypothesis (= first disjunct in 5)
7. NPBQk ∈ v 6, T2 in Lemma 10.3 [ PBA → NPBA]
8. PBQk ∈ z we get v ≈ z by 1 [see the first subproof above]
and the first conjunct in 3; then use 7 and the
definition of ≈ in Mq
9. ¬B ∈ z 8, 4, A6(n) [j < k]
where 9 and the second conjunct in 3 contradict the consistency of z (∈ U). Assume next:
10. ¬PBQk ∈ v hypothesis (= second disjunct in 5)
11. OB¬Qk ∈ v 10, A6(e)
12. NOB¬Qk ∈ v 11, A6(g)
13. OB¬Qk ∈ u we get v ≈ u by 1 and the symmetry of ≈; then
use 12 together with the definition of ≈ in Mq
14. ¬Q ∈ v 1, definition of R in Mq , 13k B
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charge the three hypotheses 10, 6 and 3 (by steps of disjunction elimination and existential
instantiation) and observe that the hypothesis 2 has been reduced ad absurdum. Hence:
15. ∀z(u ≈ z&B ∈ z ⊃ r(v) r(z)) by negation introduction and some
obvious transformations
16. ∀z(u ≈ z&Mq, [z] ∼ lg, [z] ∼ lat  B ⊃ v z) 15, Coincidence Lemma 11.1,
definition of
So, 1 ⊃ 16 is the desired conclusion in this subproof, which is hereby complete. And so
is the proof of the left-to-right direction in δ3.
Right-to-left. We prove this direction in δ3 by showing that the negation of the left
member of δ3 implies the negation of its right member, i.e., implies that the first two
conjuncts in the right member of δ3 together imply the negation of the third one.
Assume, then, for any B in Sent and any u,v in U :
1. not: uRB v hypothesis
Then:
2. ∃C (OBC ∈ u&C /∈ v) 1, definition of RB in Mq
3. OBC ∈ u&C /∈ v hypothesis for existential instantiation
4. u ≈ v &B ∈ v hypothesis
5. NOBC ∈ u 3 (first conjunct), A6(g)
6. OBC ∈ v 4 (first conjunct), 5, definition of ≈ in Mq
Let r(v) = k (1 k m):
7. Qk ∈ v useful facts
Let us then first assume:
8. k = 1 hypothesis
9. Q1 ∈ v 7, 8, logic of =
10. Q1 → (OBC → (B → C)) ∈ v A6(o), v ∈ U
11. C ∈ v 9, 6, 4 (second conjunct), 10
where 11 and the second conjunct in 3 contradict the consistency of v(∈ U). Hence:
neg(4) [= the negation of 4]. by negation introduction, discharging 4
12. 4 ⊃ ∃z(u ≈ z&Mq, [z] ∼ lg, [z] ∼ lat  B & not:v z) from the preceding line
“vacuously”, i.e., by A0
12 is “almost” our desired conclusion in this case of k = 1.
Assume next:
13. k > 1 hypothesis
14. u ≈ v &B ∈ v hypothesis (must be re-assumed here, as 4 was
discharged in the case of k = 1)
15. (Qk ∧OBC ∧B ∧ ¬C) ∈ v 7, 3, 14; yielding OBC ∈ v (as in step 6), B ∈ v
as well as C /∈ v
16. PB(Q1 ∨ · · · ∨Qk−1) ∈ v 13, 15, A6(p)
17. PBQ1 ∈ v or . . . or PBQk−1 ∈ v immediate from 16 by PB being distributive over ∨,
as claimed by T3 (generalized) in Lemma 10.3
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18. PBQj ∈ v hypothesis
19. ∃z (v RB z&Qj ∈ z) by a standard Makinson–Lemmon–Scott argument
applied to 18
20. ∃z (v ≈ z&B ∈ z&Qj ∈ z) from 19: the first two conjuncts inside ∃z follow
from v RB z by the left-to-right direction supra
21. ∃z (u ≈ z&B ∈ z& r(v) > r(z)) 13, 14, 20, ≈ an equivalence relation on U , useful
facts [r(z) = j  k − 1 < k = r(v)]
22. ∃z (u ≈ z&Mq, [z] ∼ lg, [z] ∼ lat  B & not: v z) 21, Coincidence Lemma 11.1,
definition of
where 22 is equivalent to the negation of the third conjunct in the right member of δ3.
Now, since the deduction 18–22 goes through for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, 22 follows
from 17 by a step of disjunction elimination, where all the k − 1 hypotheses 18 are dis-
charged. Hence:
23. 14 ⊃ 22 from the deduction 14–22 by DedTh, discharging 14
Then, since line 12 is identical to line 23, they yield the desired conclusion by the
Coincidence Lemma 11.1 (as applied to 14, i.e., to 4): we discharge the hypotheses 8 and
13 by another step of disjunction elimination and the hypothesis 3 by a step of existential
instantiation. Thus, 23 ultimately depends only on the initial hypothesis 1, and 23 is the
negation of the right member of δ3.
This completes the proof of the right-to-left direction in δ3, as well as the validation of
that condition as a whole. The proof of Theorem 11.2 is thereby complete as well. 
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